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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper, the initial report of an ongoing study, is threefold. One is to present and demonstrate the use of the sociology of translation as a methodological framework for the study of power within the higher education policy arena. The second is to define the boundaries and shape of that arena, and the third is to define the meaning of power within this context. The paper notes that the nation's Executive branch has forfeited its role as a policy participant and become a policy barrier, leaving Congress to look for an intersection of policy interests that can be negotiated or forced past the Executive. Through an examination of the student financial aid reauthorization process, the paper reveals the importance of knowledge, communications, coalition building, and grounding policy proposals in the history and culture of the policy arena. The social relationships that foster the exchange and interaction between the Congress and the associations it deals with in policymaking constitute a communication community. The power of this type of community is the product of a common language, cooperative activities, mutual needs, shared history and values, and widely understood signs and symbols. (Contains over 170 references.) (GLR)

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POWER AND POLITICS
IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY ARENA

Presented by
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ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF HIGHER EDUCATION

This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Association for the Study of Higher Education held at the Marriott City Center, Minneapolis, Minnesota, October 29 - November 1, 1992. This paper was reviewed by ASHE and was judged to be of high quality and of interest to others concerned with the research of higher education. It has therefore been selected to be included in the ERIC collection of ASHE conference papers.

During the 1980s, the Reagan administration repeatedly attempted to reduce funding for some student financial aid and institutional aid programs, and to eliminate still other programs under the Higher Education Act (HEA). Despite the efforts of a popular President, the higher education lobby was not only able to resist these attempts, but actually won increased funding for student aid (Hartle, 1990). The Bush administration continued the Reagan agenda by signaling its intent to use the Higher Education Amendments of 1992 as a vehicle to institute funding reductions, program reforms, and program elimination. In response to the Administration proposals, members of Congress put forth a reauthorization agenda that called for individual Pell Grant award increases, a Pell Grant entitlement, an early awareness program to increase the participation rates of underrepresented groups in higher education, a program of direct loans, and increased aid to middle income students. The higher education associations, too diverse to speak with one voice, offered a less focused agenda. A majority of the associations called for increasing the dollar amount of individual Pell Grant awards as well as increasing total funding for the program, a direct loan program, and addressing what was perceived as a loan-grant imbalance in the student aid program.

The Higher Education Amendments of 1992 seem to represent a repeat of the 1980s. The President proposed major program cuts and restructuring, the Congress favored greater student access while recognizing the need to improve program management and control rising costs, and the associations wanted a general expansion of the student aid programs, but not at the expense of increased federal oversight of higher education. The final legislation reflects much of what the higher education associations wanted and little of what they opposed. If policy outcomes are a measure of power, then the

higher education associations proved once again that they are powerful policy actors.

While this is one interpretation of the role of higher education associations in the policy formation process, it may not be an accurate interpretation. In examining the roles of the different policy actors, it is easy to observe their involvement in the policy formation process, the policy positions that they hold, and the outcome of policy actions, but the role of power in the process is not so easily understood or explained. A number of research questions grow out of the problem of power: What are the bases of power? How is power exercised in the policy process? How is power used to influence legislation? Who has power? How is power gained? Who benefits from the exercise of power? Does power diminish or increase as it is exercised? The problem of power and the related research questions have been addressed in some policy arenas, but not in the federal higher education policy arena.

This paper is part of a larger, ongoing study of power in the higher education policy arena. As such, it represents an early exploration and interpretation of power that may change as the study continues to unfold. With that in mind, what follows is the initial report of a work in progress. The purpose of this paper is threefold. One is to present and demonstrate the use of the sociology of translation as a methodological framework for the study of power. The second is to define the boundaries and shape of the higher education policy arena. The third is to define the meaning of power within the context of the higher education policy arena.

The Sociology Of Translation

The use of power as a framework for policy analysis has "fallen into comparative disfavor" (Champlin, 1971, p. 2) after having been the focus of

considerable attention in the immediate post-World War II decades. The movement away from the use of power as a construct in policy research may well be associated with the difficulty encountered in defining power in operational terms. Many researchers follow Thomas Hobbes by defining power in terms of causation, but this is often an inadequate approach (Champlin, 1971). One way to avoid this problem is to follow the path first charted by Niccolo Machiavelli (Adams, 1977) and continued today by interpretivist theorists. In terms of research methodology, this requires an approach aimed at translating the meaning of power as it appears in different social contexts and "uncovering the rules of the game" (Clegg, 1989, p. 31). The use of an interpretive approach makes it possible to reclaim power as a framework for policy analysis.

The methodological approach selected for translating the meaning of power and learning the rules of the game in the higher education policy arena is Callon and Latour's (1981) sociology of translation. The sociology of translation can be divided into four steps or "moments" (Callon, 1986). The first step in the process is problematization. In problematization, the policy actor attempts to either convince other actors that his/her definition of the problem is the correct definition or that his/her solution is the proper solution for a given problem definition. The second step in the process is interestment. This means that an actor must make his/her position interesting to actors who have expressed an interest in or made a commitment to another problem definition/solution. The third step, enrollment, builds on the first two steps by seeking to produce stable alliances and coalitions that last through the current policy action. The last step in the translation process is mobilization. This consists of the steps, actions, strategies, etc., that are employed to maintain the alliance through the policy decision. By using these steps as a guide, one can discover how power is obtained, what power does, and how power is maintained. The primary advantage of this approach is that power .

is not defined *a priori*, but instead takes its meaning from the social setting being studied.

To demonstrate the use of this methodology, the remainder of this section is devoted to a more complete explanation of the four steps. The discussion is organized around problematization, interestment, enrollment, and mobilization, with examples to illustrate the role of each step in the translation process. Finally, the reader is cautioned to remember that these steps overlap and mix in a far more complex social interaction than is suggested by this simple linear presentation. Translation is a continuous process and any description is at best a snapshot that quickly ages as the process moves forward in a never ending reenactment of the translation steps.

Problematization was described as an actor's attempts to either convince other actors that his/her definition of the problem is the correct definition of the problem or that his/her solution is the proper solution for a given problem definition. This is one aspect of problematization, but the implications extend beyond this to the creation of policy arenas. Policy arenas are created by marking off two distinct boundaries. The first boundary is the one that divides higher education from other policy issues while the second marks off what can and cannot be problematized within the higher education policy arena.

The first boundary was drawn some time ago by Congress and is beyond the focus of this study. By creating Education Committees and Subcommittees in the House and Senate, Congress established a recognized policy territory that is largely off limits to other committees. Within this closed domain, policy actors, over time, have developed a language, a logic, and a coherence that drives the higher education policy formation process (Callon, 1980).

The second boundary, between what can and cannot be problematized, exists within the confines of the first boundary. Unlike the boundary that

separates higher education from other policy arenas, this internal boundary is subject to constant contest and conflict. The ideal solution for a policy actor within the arena is to place his/her problems/solutions into black boxes (Callon & Latour, 1981). Black boxes contain issues that are accepted within the policy arena and are no longer subject to dispute. The more black boxes an actor controls the greater the area of the policy arena he/she can control. It also means that an actor can safely leave these issues and move to problemize other issues. Of course, no matter how successful an actor might be in organizing black boxes, they seldom remain securely closed because other policy actors are always attempting to open the boxes.

The reauthorization process started with a number of issues already in black boxes. Pell Grants, Stafford Loans, TRIO programs, college work-study, supplemental grants, and other Title IV programs created by earlier reauthorizations were to a large extent immune from problematization. Policy actors who wanted to amend or replace these programs had to find a way to pry the lids off the black boxes that held the programs. Depending upon the level of success in opening the programs to problematization, this could mean no change in the programs, marginal change, or wholesale reform.

Early in the process it seemed that all of the black boxes might be opened for the first major program reforms and changes since the 1972 Higher Education Amendments. Representative William Ford, House Postsecondary Education Subcommittee Chair, announced that this would be an historic reauthorization with everything in the HEA being placed on the table for consideration and negotiation. Thomas R. Wolanin, Ford's Staff Director, repeated the message in numerous articles, interviews, and speeches to higher education associations. David V. Evans, Senator Claiborne Pell's Staff Director, echoed the message from the Senate side. The White House offered some support for this position when a

proposal for a direct student loan program to replace the Stafford Loan program, thus removing the banks, lenders, and guarantee agencies from the student loan program, was leaked to the New York Times.

What appeared to be the opening of a broad avenue of problematization was quickly blocked by a confluence of events. The White House, after gauging reaction to the direct loan proposal, reversed itself and announced that the President would veto any bill that included a direct loan program or a Pell Grant entitlement. The new Secretary of Education, Lamar Alexander, presented a legislative package that restricted the range of existing programs and offered no acceptable new programs. In the Senate, Education Subcommittee Chair Claiborne Pell announced that his Subcommittee would live by the budget agreement, thus limiting the possibility of any new programs or any major changes in existing programs. Finally, a number of issues escaped the boundaries of the policy arena and focused public attention on the higher education policy arena. Public and Congressional dissatisfaction with the complexity of the student aid application process, the high cost of loan defaults, and the sense that higher education was becoming financially inaccessible to low and middle income students meant that the Subcommittees would have to present solutions to public issues that had been problemized outside the policy arena, or risk losing their ability to define issues within the arena.

In the problematization step, policy actors can respond in one of four ways (Callon, 1980). One response, tagging along, is the recognition that an actor's problem\solution coincides with that of the other actors and that there is much to be gained by tagging along with those actors. The second response, negotiation one, occurs when an actor is in agreement on all issues except for the formulation of his\her problem. This recognition is followed by limited detailed negotiations on the specific problem, but not on other problems\solutions. The third response,

negotiation two, occurs when actors are in agreement with the problem formulation, but in disagreement on everything else. The last response, opposition, occurs when an actor challenges the problematization of policy as a whole.

The American Council on Education (ACE) initiated a process designed to move the higher education associations from a negotiation to a tagging along response. ACE organized a series of task forces that included representatives from virtually all of the higher education associations with the exception of the Career College Association (CCA). ACE refuses to recognize proprietary schools as a legitimate segment of higher education. The task force reports fed into a comprehensive set of policy proposals and recommendations that were submitted to the House and Senate Subcommittees. When the various associations accepted and signed the comprehensive submissions, they agreed to tag along with one another.

The internal negotiations that produced the tagging along agreement were not revealed during field interviews. This may have been agreed to by the associations as a way to protect the enrollment that came with successful interestment. In any case, the recommendations prepared for the Subcommittees were signed by the ACE as well as the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges (AACJC), American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU), Association of American Universities (AAU), Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities (ACCU), Association of Urban Universities (AUU), National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education (NAFEOHE), National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO), National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU), National Association of Schools and Colleges of the United Methodist Church (NASCUMC),

and the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC).

The ACE process combined problematization and interestment. This combination of translation steps is apparent in at least three specific actions. The task forces and policy proposals discussed above involved both problematization and interestment. As the various associations negotiated towards problematization closure, they attempted to interest one another in their problems\solutions. The end result of interestment was to confirm the validity of the problematization reflected in the final recommendations and to cement the alliance implied by the agreement. Interestment does not always produce enrollment, but in this case it did as individual associations agreed to act as one in support of the policy recommendations.

Responsibility for supporting the policy recommendations was divided among the associations with individual associations taking the lead on specific recommendations, but with the expressed backing of the entire group. In this way, micro-actors were transformed into macro-actors speaking with one voice for the majority of the higher education associations. For example, AAU or NASULGC would take the lead on issues involving graduate education or science programs, but would speak to the issue for the entire group. Issues impacting two year colleges and students would go to AACJC, who would then speak for the whole group.

A second activity involved the associations' interactions with the House and Senate Subcommittees. As associations worked on proposals, they checked with House and Senate staffers to gauge their responses. This helped the associations develop a sense of what the Subcommittees would and would not accept. It also served as a vehicle for problematization and interestment as association representatives attempted to move Subcommittee staffers towards association

problematizations. In some cases, this resulted in Subcommittee members adopting association positions as their own.

The third activity consisted of a series of weekly meetings organized by ACE. The Friday meetings were open to most of the higher education associations and functioned primarily as an information exchange. Two, more important meetings, were scheduled on Mondays. One was a meeting of the Secretariat and invited association representatives while the other was a meeting of the Brethren. These meetings served the combined purposes of problematization, interestment, enrollment, and mobilization.

Two groups, the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators (NASFAA) and the National Council of (NCEOA), participated in the ACE process, but elected not to sign the final policy recommendations. Each association's decision not to sign was motivated by a different set of factors. One reason NASFAA submitted a separate set of policy proposals to the Subcommittees was the organization's desire to change its image as an association to consult on technical matters and to begin to forge the image of an association with expertise on broad policy issues. In contrast, NCEOA is a narrowly focused association and seldom addresses issues outside of its focus, thus its decision was consistent with past practice.

CCA was not invited to participate in the ACE organized reauthorization process, because it represents proprietary schools. This placed CCA on the margin, but then the entire problematization process tended to move CCA towards the margin. CCA attempted to counter this by acting in opposition to the problematization of policy as a whole. In doing this, CCA wanted to shift the discussion away from loan defaults, student debt burden, institutional integrity, and other issues that created a negative focus on proprietary schools.

CCA wanted to problemize the reauthorization policy questions in a way that focused on student outcomes and on preparing the workforce for the next century. By focusing on these issues, CCA felt that it could produce a set of problem definitions\solutions that favored proprietary schools. Try as they might, CCA was simply unable to interest the Subcommittees in their problematization of the issues.

Interestment also overlapped with activities and actions designed to produce enrollment and mobilization . Each of the above associations had to interest its members in the association's position before it could attempt to interest and enroll other associations. This went beyond conventional consensus building due to the nature of association membership. Using ACE as an example, ACE has associations as members, thus it had to develop policy positions that were acceptable to associations who were ACE members as well as possible policy competitors. in contrast, AAU speaks for fewer than one hundred universities, but members such as Harvard and Yale have the ability to speak with a national voice if they disagree with the AAU position. As the interestment process produced enrollment, it was necessary to assign mobilization tasks and activities to associations and institutions to help maintain enrollment.

The interactions between the association and Subcommittee staffs produced, in some instances, enrollment and mobilization of Subcommittee members. For example, Senator Edward M. Kennedy's staff adopted the NASFAA needs analysis proposal, before NASFAA had finalized the proposal, and introduced it as legislation. The resulting criticism focused on NASFAA, seriously damaging its ability to function as a macro-actor for the remainder of the reauthorization process. In contrast, NASULGC's direct loan program was championed by Representative Robert E. Andrews after it had been developed

jointly in meetings between his office and NASULGC. A pilot direct loan program was part of the final legislation.

The House and Senate reauthorization hearings were an opportunity for interestment and mobilization. The hearings were a form of interestment in that they presented an opportunity for associations to move other policy actors towards their positions. The hearings were a form of mobilization in that they acted as a device for maintaining the alliance as representatives from the associations professed their support for the agreed upon problematization.

The associations also designed activities to interest and mobilize Subcommittee members and staff. One of the better known activities were the CCA organized campus visits. A CCA school would invite a Subcommittee member to visit, meet faculty and students, speak at a dinner, and accept a campaign contribution. NASFAA arranged visits to campus financial aid offices so the Subcommittee members and staff could see how student aid rules and regulations worked in the field. All of the associations arranged for visits and calls from the field to Subcommittee members' offices. In addition to serving the purpose of influencing policy makers, these activities also helped mobilize the associations and maintain the alliance.

Finally, the effort to exert influence was not unidirectional. The Subcommittees also worked to mobilize the associations. After an agreement had been reached on the Pell Grant formula in the House, Representative Williams introduced an amendment to change the formula. The proposed change would have helped public schools and low income students, but would have reopened the translation process that had been so carefully nurtured towards closure over the previous year. Representative Ford's office lobbied the associations to stand by the agreement. The associations remained firm and the amendment was defeated.

The discussion of the sociology of translation and its application in the higher education policy arena could be extended to produce a rich, detailed, contextual narrative from which the reader could then "uncover the rules of the game." The purpose here is not to present the entire narrative, but to present enough information about the sociology of translation as a methodology and the knowledge produced through the use of that methodology to convince the reader that the interpretations that follow are grounded in the social context and reality of the higher education policy arena. The next section draws upon the knowledge produced through the application of the sociology of translation to bring the policy arena into focus and to make it more tangible to the reader.

The Higher Education Policy Arena

The sociology of translation the can be combined with the literature on subgovernments to chart the boundaries and shape of the higher education policy arena. The term subgovernment probably evokes images of an iron triangle in which Congress, the White House, and interest groups produce policy, isolated from the majority, designed to assist a chosen few at the expense of the masses. This may in fact describe some subgovernments, but it appears to be more a caricature of the concept than the reality of subgovernments in operation. A more productive way to think about subgovernments is as a continuum of policy arenas ranging from closed iron triangles at one end to open issues networks at the other end (Hamm, 1986). Criterion characteristics can then be used to judge where a particular policy arena might fit along the continuum. The criterion characteristics used to define the higher education policy arena are: 1. internal complexity; 2. functional autonomy; 3. unity within type of participant, and; 4. cooperation or conflict among the different participants (Hamm, 1983). Each of the four

characteristics are examined below in an effort to give definition and focus to the higher education policy arena.

Policy Arena Characteristics

Internal Complexity

Internal complexity is used to refer "to the number and variety of participants in the subsystem" (Hamm, 1983, p. 381). By this definition, the higher education policy arena is a low to moderately complex policy arena. The number of key participants is small enough that most, if not all, of the participants know one another personally. Also, the variety of participants, as will be shown, is of a limited range. Finally, the number of Committees involved in reauthorization consists of one in the House and one in the Senate.

The Congress. The Committees are the central participants in the policy arena and the focus of attention for most of the other participants. They must reauthorize HEA and can hold oversight hearings on HEA programs or on any related higher education concerns. The Committees, and more importantly the Subcommittees, are obligatory passage points for all major policy decisions within the arena. In the House, the key Committee is the Education and Labor Committee while in the Senate it is the Labor and Human Resources Committee. The respective Subcommittees are Postsecondary Education and Education, Arts and Humanities.

While all of the Committee and Subcommittee members are well positioned to influence legislation, three members and their staffs were generally acknowledged as the key policy actors in the 1992 reauthorization. The key policy actor on the House Subcommittee is William D. Ford. In part, this is due to his role as both Chair of the full Committee and Chair of the Subcommittee, but it also comes from more than twenty-five years of

involvement and experience with education issues in the House. Ford was a sponsor of MISAA and has long favored expanding student aid to more middle income families. During the 1980s, he was one of the Democrats who successfully lead the fight against Reagan Administration proposals for deep cuts in student aid programs. For the 1992 reauthorization, Ford called for a major redesign of the HEA loan and grant programs (Cooper, 1992, February 4). Among the ideas put forward by Ford were front-loading Pell Grants, eliminating Perkins loans, increasing the size of SEOG awards, increasing aid to middle income students, and support for direct lending.

The Staff Director for the Subcommittee is Thomas R. Wolanin, who was also Staff Director from 1985 to 1987. Wolanin is known in Congress for his detailed knowledge of HEA and is known in academia for his writing on higher education policy issues. The recipient of a doctorate in government from Harvard University, Wolanin was at one time a professor at the University of Wisconsin, but left the academy so that he could make policy rather than merely study policy. Wolanin's introduction to HEA came when he was on leave from Wisconsin working for Congressman Frank Thompson, Jr. during the 1972 reauthorization.

Without question, the key policy actor on the Senate Subcommittee is the Chair, Claiborne Pell. As either the Chair or ranking member, Pell has helped shape every HEA reauthorization since 1972. A fixture in the Senate since 1960, Pell has consistently championed equal educational opportunity, nondiscrimination between different types of postsecondary education, and aid to students rather than to institutions. Coming into the 1992 reauthorization Pell continued to address his traditional concerns as well as expressing an interest in stricter licensing and accreditation standards for postsecondary institutions as a means of

quality control for federal student aid expenditures, expanding aid to middle class students, and early intervention programs.

The Staff Director of the Subcommittee is David V. Evans who has worked for Pell since 1978. During the 1986 reauthorization, Evans was the Minority Staff Director. When the Democrats regained control of the Senate in 1987, he became the Subcommittee Staff Director. Given the broad jurisdiction of Senate committees, Evans has shared the workload on higher education with Sarah A. Flanagan who has been with the Subcommittee since 1987. Flanagan is responsible for most of the contacts and interactions with higher education lobbyists.

The third key policy actor is Senator Edward M. Kennedy who is both a member of the Subcommittee and Chair of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources. A longtime advocate of education, Kennedy's involvement with HEA dates from its creation in 1965. Kennedy outlined much of his reauthorization agenda in a Roll Call article in early 1991. The issues that Kennedy (1991, March 18) saw as important challenges for reauthorization were "the loan-grant imbalance, the integrity of the student loan program, and the excessive complexity of the student aid process" (p. 13). In addition, he expressed an interest in early intervention programs and Pell Grant entitlement.

Terry W. Hartle is the Education Staff Director for the Committee on Labor and Human Resources and a key aide to Senator Kennedy on higher education issues. Hartle, a former policy analyst with the American Enterprise Institute, has also written on federal student aid programs. In some of his published work, Hartle has been critical of the complexity of the system, the role and growth of the GSL program, and the efforts of higher education associations to promote reform of the system (e.g., Doyle & Hartle, 1985).

While these are the key policy actors, other members of the Subcommittees had policy concerns that they communicated and publicized within the higher education policy arena. A number of these issues were reported to the higher education associations through Educational Record. In the summer of 1990, Andra Armstrong (1990) reported the views of various House and Senate members in "How the Hill sees Higher Education." Members also used Roll Call, public interviews, press releases, and speeches to communicate their reauthorization agendas.

The Executive. While the key policy actors in the Executive branch should be as easy to identify as those in the Congress, the Bush Administrations' policies and personnel were marked by flux and turmoil coming into the reauthorization process. In the fall of 1990, Education Secretary Lauro F. Cavazos ruled out separate student aid programs for colleges and trade schools while announcing plans to link aid to academic achievement and student retention rates (DeLoughry, 1990, October 3). In December, Cavazos resigned as Education Secretary reportedly because White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu told him it was time to leave (DeLoughry, 1990, December 19).

In January 1991, Bush nominated Lamar Alexander to become the next Education Secretary. Alexander had served as Governor of Tennessee from 1979 through 1987 and had been President of the University of Tennessee system since 1988 (DeLoughry, 1991, January 9). Alexander brought a track record on education to an Administration that was desperate to make good on Bush's claim of being the Education President, but the conventional wisdom was that he was not appointed on the basis of his education record and experience. One of the reasons some believed he was appointed was his close friendship with Sununu. Another was his reputation as a determined, savvy, political operative who could guide legislation through the Congress.

To give Alexander the opportunity to select his own leadership team, the White House asked for the resignations of most of the top Education Department officials (DeLoughry, 1991, April 3). Among those asked to resign was Leonard L. Haynes, III, Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary Education. While Haynes left immediately, his position was not immediately filled. Instead, Michael J. Farrell, who Alexander had selected to be Assistant Secretary for Student Financial Assistance, was also asked to fill the Postsecondary Education slot on an interim basis (DeLoughry, 1991, December 4). In November, Farrell resigned from both positions, but gave no public reason for his departure (DeLoughry, 1991, December 11).

In September, Bush announced the nomination of Carolynn Reid-Wallace to fill the position of Assistant Secretary of Postsecondary Education (DeLoughry, 1991, September 18). Her nomination to the post was favorably received by the higher education community. Reid-Wallace brought a broad range of experiences to the position including a tenure as Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs for the City University of New York System, as Assistant Director of Education for the National Endowment for the Humanities, as Dean at Bowie State University, and as an administrator with the National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education. Farrell's resignation announcement came on the same day the Senate confirmed Reid-Wallace's nomination.

The instability of the Education Department was symptomatic of the Bush Administration's inability to fashion and articulate a coherent education policy. In an effort to give substance and clarity to his claim of being the Education President, Bush announced "America 2000" in a speech at the White House on April 18, 1991. The "America 2000" speech presented the President's strategy to "restructure and revitalize America's education system by the year 2000" ("America 2000," April 18, 1991, p.1). The President's strategy focused

exclusively on K through 12 without a single word on higher education for the Education Subcommittees that were then holding hearings on the legislation that would take a key sector of the education system into the year 2000.

In summary, while the White House is the final passage point in the reauthorization process, the Executive branch was in a state of confusion and flux from the very beginning of the process. No one in Congress, Democrat or Republican, seemed to know what the White House wanted from reauthorization or who was in charge. This may be because no one in the White House knew. The best example of this uncertainty is Bush's position on direct loans and Pell Grant entitlement. After initially supporting both, Bush threatened to veto legislation that contained either. This uncertainty served to increase the policy arena's internal complexity.

The Associations. The third group of participants in the policy arena are the higher education associations that attempt to lobby the Congress and the Executive. While they certainly lobby by any conventional definition of the term, most associations claim not to be lobbyists due to their inordinate fear of violating Section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby losing their tax-exempt status (Bioland, 1985). The number and diversity of higher education associations gives some credence to the lament that "no other segment of American society has so many organizations and is yet so unorganized as higher education" (Babbidge and Rosenzvieg, 1962, p. 92). While there are a large number of associations, only a few are recognized as active policy actors, thus it is relatively easy to identify and discuss this segment of the policy arena.

The major higher education associations are housed in the National Center for Higher Education at One Dupont Circle in Washington, DC, and the address has become a shorthand way to refer to higher education associations. Of the twenty plus associations that reside at One Dupont, only the American Association of

Community and Junior Colleges (AACJC), the American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU), the American Council on Education (ACE), the Association of American Universities (AAU), and the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC) have been consistently active policy actors in the higher education policy arena. ACE, an umbrella organization, has often attempted to forge consensus positions on policy issues getting as many associations as possible to speak with one voice on the issue before attempting to influence the Congress or the Executive. The other five associations, all of which are institutional associations, have then provided the expertise on specific areas policy issues that impact their member institutions.

ACE has long claimed to speak for all of higher education, but for many years its voice was seldom heard in Washington and its organizational structure all but prevented decision making when Congress did ask for an opinion (Babbidge & Rosenzweig, 1962). It was only after the burst of education legislation in the 1960s, the defeat of institutional aid in 1972, and sharp public criticism from the White House and members of Congress that ACE began to undertake an internal reevaluation and reorganization aimed at improving its governmental relations function. Much of that work, directed by then President Roger Heyns and Vice President Stephen K. Bailey, took place in the mid-1970s.

One of the changes brought by Heyns and Bailey was the hiring of Charles B. Saunders as the new Director of the Division of Governmental Relations (King, 1975). Saunders, now Vice President of Governmental Relations, brought a wealth of experience to the task having previously served as a Senate staff member, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Education, and Acting Assistant Secretary of Education (Bioland, 1985; Graham, 1984). One of Saunders' initial acts was to organize an informal weekly meeting between members of the major education associations at One Dupont Circle, the National Association of

University Business Officers (NACUBO), and the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU) (Bioland, 1985). Later, Saunders initiated a second weekly meeting with a larger group of higher education representatives. These informal meetings served different purposes. The smaller group represented an opportunity to exchange information, identify positions, and move towards consensus. The larger group acted as a monitor of events and an information exchange for the participants. These groups continued to meet into the 1990s and served much the same purpose during the 1992 reauthorization.

Early in the 1992 reauthorization process, ACE was very cautious about taking well formed positions on any of the policy issues facing the Education Subcommittees. In its Higher Education Issues in the 102nd Congress (ACE, 1991), ACE limited its position to stating that "the higher education community expects to make recommendations to address a number of policy issues" (p. 10). Consistent with its self-image as the lead association "to coordinate the formation of policy on the national issues and problems of higher education" (Bioland, 1985, p. 17), ACE worked to forge a broad consensus on reauthorization issues. The primary mechanism for achieving consensus were six task forces established in the spring of 1989 to review HEA and identify reauthorization issues. The end product of this process was the comprehensive set of recommendations for reauthorization that were submitted to both the House and Senate Subcommittees.

ACE's coordinating role and the shared One Dupont address means that the associations are often lumped together and treated as one. In fact, each association tends to stress what is most important to its institutional members and, at times, to take positions not covered by the consensus agreements that rule One Dupont Circle. AASCU, founded in 1961, might be the best example of an association that has been willing to step out from the One Dupont Circle group. AASCU has a consistent record of speaking out for lower tuition and equal

opportunity in higher education. AASCU's position on tuition has at times put it at odds with other associations. Edward M. Elmendorf, AASCU's Vice President for Governmental Relations and a former Assistant Secretary of Education for Postsecondary Education in the Reagan Administration, has been a visible and effective spokesman.

NASULGC, like AASCU, has a strong record of supporting low tuition and equal educational opportunity. Because so many of its member institutions have graduate schools, NASULGC also speaks out on graduate education, international studies, and research. Jerold Roschwald, NASULGC Director of Federal Relations-Higher Education worked closely with AASCU and AAU in preparing for reauthorization. In addition, Thomas A. Butts, Associate Vice President for Governmental Relations at the University of Michigan, worked with NASULGC to develop and lobby for a direct loan program.

AAU was founded in 1900 by fourteen American university offering the Ph.D. Today, AAU consists of some fifty-six American and two Canadian universities, but its focus remains research and graduate education. Given that AAU's interests often overlap with NASULGC's and with the Council of Graduate Schools, John C. Vaughn, AAU Director of Federal Relations, frequently coordinates with these associations to maximize their potential impact on federal policy issues. Vaughn also lead the ACE task force on graduate and professional education.

AACJC was established in 1920 to represent the interests of junior colleges. AACJC claims to have a community or junior college in every congressional district, but the nature of this higher education sector is such that many of its issues are state rather than federal issues. This may explain why Frank Mensel, AACJC Vice President of Federal Relations, can also serve as director of Federal Relations for the Association of Community College Trustees.

While One Dupont Circle is home to the National Center for Higher Education, important higher education groups are also located elsewhere in Washington, DC.. One of the more important of these is the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators (NASFAA). NASFAA is often cited for its technical knowledge and expertise. Founded in the mid-1960s, NASFAA now speaks for some 3,200 campuses and 9,000 financial aid officers nationwide (DeWitt, 1991). Traditionally, NASFAA has been noted not only for its technical expertise, but also for being the surrogate voice of college students and their parents. In 1992, under the leadership of Dallas Martin, NASFAA sought to expand its traditional role and become an actor on larger policy issues. As part of this effort, NASFAA organized its own reauthorization task force to prepare a full range of HEA proposals for the authorizing committees. In addition, Martin chaired the ACE task force on needs analysis and student aid delivery, but NASFAA did not sign the ACE consensus recommendations.

Another key association is the National Council of Educational Opportunity Associations (NCEOA). This ten year old association represents Upward Bound, Talent Search, Student Support Services, and other TRIO programs directed towards low income and minority students. Under the leadership of Arnold Mitchem, NCEOA has consistently convinced Congress to increase TRIO funding.

A third association outside One Dupont Circle that must be mentioned in any list of key higher education policy actors is the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU). Just as ACE acts as an umbrella association for higher education, NAICU is the umbrella association for higher education's independent sector. In preparing for the 1992 reauthorization, NAICU worked with the ACE consensus group and signed the recommendations that came out of that process. Julianne S. Thrift, then NAICU Executive Vice President, chaired the ACE task force on middle income students.

Finally, the Career College Association (CCA) speaks for a segment of the higher education community not represented by One Dupont Circle. CCA is the product of a merger between the National Association of Trade and Technical Schools (NATTS) and the Association of Independent Colleges and Schools (AICS). Tainted by egregious student aid abuse scandals, NATTS hired Stephen J. Blair as President in 1985 and gave him the task of cleaning up the organization. Blair, formerly Director of Policy and Program Development in the Education Department's Office of Student Financial Assistance, succeeded to the point that AICS, formerly the lead association for the sector, merged with NATTS, largely as a matter of survival. Today, CCA has six full-time lobbyists and a political action committee that donates to Congressional campaigns.

Bolstering the lobbying staff was designed to overcome political damage caused by the student aid abuse scandals. When possible, Blair hired former Congressional staff members to lobby their old committees (DeParle, 1992, March 25). The hiring of Patty Sullivan, who had worked for Representative Pat Williams is the premier example of this tactic. Blair also hired consultants such as Bob Beckel, a member of the Mondale Presidential campaign, and Haley Barbour, a member of the Reagan White House, to help CCA prepare for reauthorization.

While other associations and organizations are active, the above are the most active higher education associations in the policy arena. The addition of other, less active organizations would not significantly alter the level of internal complexity of the higher education policy arena. At the beginning of this section, the arena was described as being of low to moderate complexity and the above discussion would seem to support that assessment. Visually, the complexity of relationships and number of participants can be viewed below in Table 1.

Table 1
Participants in the Higher Education Policy Arena

	<u>Executive</u>
	President
	Education Secretary
	Senior Ed Officials
	OMB
<u>Associations</u>	<u>Congress</u>
One Dupont Circle Associations	House Education and Labor Committee
CCA	Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education
NAICU	Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee
NASFAA	Subcommittee on Education, Arts, and Humanities
NCEOA	
Lender Associations	

Functional Autonomy

Functional autonomy is "the extent to which policies are formulated and implemented within the subsystem" (Hamm, 1983, p. 381). By this definition, the higher education policy arena enjoys a high level of functional autonomy. This is not to suggest that the arena has been immune from attacks on its functional autonomy. The 1968 student conduct debates and the 1972 busing debates are primary examples of other policy arenas seeking to infringe upon the autonomy of the higher education policy arena. Another example is the Reagan Administration's use of the budget to implement policy changes that it could not gain through the higher education policy arena. In each of these examples, the higher education policy arena was able to resist the attacks and to maintain its autonomy.

A new threat to the arena's functional autonomy arose at the beginning of the 1992 reauthorization in the form of an investigation of the federal student loan

program by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Chaired by Senator Sam Nunn, a Georgia Democrat, the Subcommittee held a series of hearings as part of an investigation that resulted in the report Abuses in Federal Student Aid Programs (1991). The findings were embraced by members of the Education Committees and Subcommittees who translated the findings into their own policy proposals. The net result was to diffuse the threat to the arena's autonomy without coming into conflict with other legislative policy arenas.

Finally, while there are no instruments for measuring functional autonomy, Hall and Evans (1990) do address the issue indirectly in their study of the power of Congressional subcommittees. Looking at three committees in the Ninety-seventh Congress, one of which was the House Committee on Education and Labor, the authors found that the Education and Labor Subcommittees drafted 88% of the Committee legislation, dominated the amending of legislation at the Committee level, and that the reporting Subcommittee lost not a single roll call vote during the entire Congress. While this is but one study, it provides additional support for the claim that the higher education policy arena enjoys a high level of functional autonomy.

Unity Within Type of Participant

Unity within type of participant is simply a way of referring to "the unity among individuals in each sector- agencies, interest groups, and committees" (Hamm, 1983, p. 382). The level of unity within the policy arena is rather strong. One way in which this can be seen is in the language used by the policy actors. The language used to describe policy issues carries with it an acceptance and understanding of the values that guide the higher education policy arena. For example, "needs analysis" means that students need help attending college, it is the federal government's role to provide that help, and it is necessary to determine how much, if any, help should be forthcoming in a fair and consistent manner.

"Equal educational opportunity" means that the federal government should play an active role in removing race, religion, sex, poverty, and other barriers that might prevent children of ability from attending college. "Access" means giving aid to students who are blocked from higher education due to financial barriers. The common language and understood values help provide a coherence, unity, and logic to the policy arena.

Since almost no one in the higher education policy arena questions the basic philosophical underpinning of problems and issues, conflicts tend to arise over specific solutions. For example, the issue of should loans be given via direct lending or through loan vendors is not an issue of loans, but one of how to deliver loans. The same is true of the loan-grant imbalance. The issue is not student loans, but the proper balance between loans and forms of grant aid. The guiding assumptions and beliefs remain unchallenged with only the solutions open to question and conflict.

Last, unity, particularly between Congress and the associations has evolved from a long history of shared cooperative activities aimed at producing workable legislation. At times, this has involved angry disputes and attacks, but the policy actors have always overcome the differences to focus on the common goal of aiding students. The resolution of these disputes and the long, shared history of the policy actors has fostered emotional and intellectual bonds that unite the participants.

Cooperation or Conflict

The characteristic of cooperation or conflict among different participants is self-explanatory. In explaining the level of conflict or cooperation in a policy arena, Hamm (1983) identifies communality of interest as a major factor. Communality of interest can be divided into two smaller components. One of these is the concept of interest overrepresentation. Bond (1979) has developed a

multiple regression analysis to measure overrepresentation, but the concept of overrepresentation remains a socially constructed research concept whose value is determined by the researcher rather than by some widely accepted quantitative benchmark. In other words, one can simply look at the membership of the Subcommittees responsible for authorization and make a reasonable judgment on overrepresentation.

What one sees in looking at the two Education Subcommittees is that higher education is well represented by members who have higher education as a major economic interest in their district or state and by members who have a long history of commitment to higher education policy issues. For example, House Subcommittee Chair Ford has a number of institutions in his district and has a long history of interest and involvement in education issues. Higher education is not a major economic interest in Montana, but Pat Williams has long held an interest in education issues. Tim Roemer is from a district in Indiana that includes an Indiana University campus, the University of Notre Dame, a Purdue University campus, and several small colleges, thus he must be concerned with higher education issues in order to represent his district. Senate Subcommittee Chair Pell has made his political name with education issues. Edward M. Kennedy has a well known interest in education and higher education is a major economic interest in Massachusetts. James Jeffords is similar to Kennedy in that he holds a personal interest in higher education and it is a major economic factor in Vermont. While this brief summary does not offer the numerical output of a multiple regression analysis, it is more than enough to establish that higher education interests are well represented and probably overrepresented on the Subcommittees.

The second component of commonality of interest is the circulation of personnel within the policy arena. To some extent, this was addressed in the discussion of internal complexity, but additional examples are provided here to

reinforce the understanding of the extensive flow of personnel within the policy arena. One example is Beth B. Buehlmann who was an education policy fellow at the National Institute of Education before she joined the minority staff of the House Committee on Education in 1979 where she remained for some twelve years before becoming the Washington representative for the California state colleges. Another is Lawrence S. Zaglaniczny, currently Assistant to the President of NASFAA, who formerly worked for ACE, as a lobbyist for a student higher education group, and as a Congressional staffer. Last is William A. Blakey who worked in the Department of Education during the Carter Administration, was later the Staff Director of the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education, and now represents the United Negro College Fund as a member of the law firm of Colhan and Dean. One higher education representative summarized the circulation of personnel by noting that "we are an incestuous lot."

Finally, unity and cooperation or conflict tend to overlap. The common language, and shared history and values, help create unity and reduce the level of conflict within the policy arena. The exchanges, in articles, papers, and speeches, between policy actors helps identify and workout disputes as well as helping to develop the language of the arena. The circulation of personnel is a major factor in cooperation and encourages unity by giving the participants multiple, shared perspectives of the policy arena.

Defining the Arena

Until the beginning of the 1980's, the higher education policy arena could be defined as a soft triangle. The term soft triangle is used to denote the relationship of the principle policy actors and the openness of the policy arena to new participants. Some observers might have used the term higher education partnership to define the arena, but this assumes an equality between the participants that has never really existed. Regardless of what term might have

been used to describe the policy arena, everything changed with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and it is not likely that the arena will return to its former configuration. A new name is required to describe the new configuration of the higher education policy arena.

The characteristics discussed above suggest a soft policy triangle with one of the legs removed. The missing leg is the Executive branch. Rather than continuing as an active participant in the policy process, the Executive, lead by the White House, seems to have been content to withdraw from the process and act as a blocking or constraining agent for the remaining participants. What remains of the soft triangle is the relationship between the Congress and the associations that seeks to produce policy, but must do so in an environment that requires constant scanning of the Executive to assess what is politically feasible.

The current policy arena can be visual depicted as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Higher Education Policy Vector

Continuing with the mathematical concepts that have been used to describe policy arenas, this configuration is called a policy vector. The term policy vector is not meant as a substitute for the policy arena concept, but rather as a type of policy

arena. The role of the associations and the Congress in a policy vector is to seek an intersection of interests that results in a policy decision. The role of the Executive is that of a blocking agent seeking to limit or constraint potential policy outcomes.

Some of the methods for reaching an intersection of interests were discussed above including policy position papers, exchanging policy views, joint development of legislative language, and testimony before Congressional committees. As Congress and the associations move towards agreement, the Executive must be constantly scanned to determine what can be negotiated with or forced past the Executive. If one looks at the crown of the V formed in the above visual representation, then the role of the Executive is to move towards the crown to block the emergence of policy, or to move away from the crown and accept policy agreements that do emerge. During much of this reauthorization, the Executive played an active blocking role. It was only near the end of the process that the Executive signaled its intent to allow the policy agreements reached between the associations and the Congress to emerge.

Returning to the criteria used to guide the discussion of the characteristics of the higher education policy arena, several points can be made which help bring the policy vector into sharper focus. First, it is a policy arena with a limited number and variety of policy actors. The low to moderate internal complexity of the policy arena is highlighted by the high level of functional autonomy that the arena enjoys. It is easy to see who is involved and who gets results on particular policy issues. The arena's autonomy has been threatened at different points, but it has been able to resist and to maintain its autonomy. The degree of unity within the policy arena depends upon the level at which a policy issue is being discussed. In general, the participants agree on the philosophical foundations that guide the arena with disagreement tending to arise as specific problem solutions are

debated. In general, cooperation among the different policy participants is the norm. The Subcommittees, the obligatory passage points for all policy decisions, are populated by members who have demonstrated either a long term interest in education, have education as a major economic interest in their state or district, or both. The Executive, the final passage point for all policy decisions, is not so much a participant as it is a barrier that must be overcome by the other participants. Finally, within the policy arena, personnel easily circulate between different organizations with some individuals having spent their entire working lives within the confines of the higher education policy arena.

The combination of the sociology of translation and the subgovernment literature is a conceptually novel approach that offers new insights into the higher education policy arena. The translation process provides a framework for describing and interpreting the struggle for power. At the same time, the subgovernment literature provides a method for charting the boundaries and shape of the higher education policy arena. These steps are a necessary precursor to defining the meaning of power within the context of the higher education policy arena, but these steps alone do not answer the question of power without further interpretation. The meaning of power within the policy arena is the focus of the next section.

Power in the Policy Arena

The use of an interpretative approach to the question of power, by definition, rules out causal definitions of power. Even if this were not true, the above discussion seems to eliminate causal definitions. For example, Dahl's (1957) famous definition of power as "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (pp. 202-3) seems moot in the context of the higher education policy arena. Pluralism and the attendant definition of power simply do not fit with the dynamics of the arena.

The definition of the arena as a policy vector might cause some readers to suggest the use of Bachrach and Baratz's (1962; 1970) two faces of power. One the face studied by Dahl, is the visible attempt of A to influence B. The other, less visible, face of power is the extent to which "a person or group - consciously or unconsciously - creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts" (Bacharach & Baratz, 1962, p. 949). Given that the Congress included programs in the final legislation that the President had promised would produce a veto of the bill, the use of non-decision theory does not seem to fit either.

Defining what power is not may appear to be of marginal use in giving meaning to power within the context of the higher education policy arena, but it is an important first step in giving meaning to power. In particular, it is important to disconnect "the concept of power from the teleological model" and to think of power as being "built up in communicative action" (Habermas, 1986, p. 76). The starting point for thinking about power in communicative action terms is with John Dewey (1988). Later, Hannah Arendt (1986) continued to develop the concept of "communicative power." Today, Jurgen Habermas (1987) is the best known proponent of this approach. By examining the higher education policy arena in light of these theories, the meaning of power can be understood

Writing in The Public and Its Problems, Dewey (1988) implies, but does not fully develop the concept of a communication community. Describing the requirements for a true democracy, Dewey (1988) claims that "it will have its consummation when free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication" (p. 184). Communication is dependent on a common language, cooperative activities, mutual needs, shared history and values, and widely understood signs and symbols. In such a society, power, the power to dominate, is replaced by problem solving.

Arendt (1986) does not cite Dewey, but her work is certainly built on the same foundation. For Arendt (1986), power "corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert" (p. 64). As a condition of acting in concert, citizens must be free and equal. It is this freedom that permits the building of communicative action which then allows social contracts to be developed. Power exists only so long as the citizens agree to the granting of power to an individual or agency.

Habermas (1979; 1984; 1987) draws upon both Dewey and Arendt in the development of his communicative action theory. At the core of Habermas' theory is the idea of uncoerced communication between competent participants. Communicative competence rests upon the ability and willingness of participants to speak without the intent to deceive. A communicative community rests on a foundation of trust reinforced by unrestrained communication. Power, the power to dominate, is a barrier to building a communicative community because power interferes with and distorts universal communication.

While the common thread of communicative action links the three theorists, Dewey, to the exclusion of Arendt and Habermas, best defines power in the higher education policy arena. Before examining the reasons for selecting Dewey, it is best to briefly explain why Arendt and Habermas are excluded. Arendt does not fit because of her reliance on the use of written social contracts rather than praxis as the means of securing unrestrained communication. The higher education policy arena is not based on a contractual foundation, but on praxis.

Habermas deserves more attention than can be granted in a short paper, but a few key points can be presented. One is that Habermas, with his explicit rules for defining communicative action, creates ideal theory. The policy arena does not function with an ideal type of uncoerced communication as its goal and many members of the arena would probably not embrace such a goal. Another problem

is the way in which Habermas divides the world into spheres. This creates a dualism that enables Habermas to separate communications from power, but in practice the policy arena tends to be an intersecting, overlapping, jumbled combination of communication and power. Finally, unlike Arendt and Dewey, Habermas does not seem to accept the idea that power can be transformed into a social good that promotes communicative action.

Defining Power

By the mid-1960s, all major higher education policy actors were followers of John Dewey. This is a bold statement given that a large number of the policy actors probably could recall Thomas Dewey, but had no sense of who John Dewey was or who he might have been. The basis for the statement is that by the mid-1960s most of the major policy actors saw education as an instrument or path for social change and reform (Graham, 1984). Eisenhower's support of the National Defense Education Act is an example of using education as an instrument to strengthen the security of the nation. Johnson's Higher Education Act is consistent with Dewey's views on using education as a means of social reform. Last, the courts' rulings on school desegregation certainly followed Dewey's (1966) charge that all "members of the group must have an equal opportunity to receive and take from others ... in a variety of shared undertakings and experiences" (p. 84).

While the higher education policy actors did not agree on all policy specifics, the arena did develop into a communication community with an unspoken agreement on the purpose of education. This became the defining characteristic of the policy arena until the Reagan and Bush Administrations began to question the purpose of education policy. When first Reagan and then Bush questioned the philosophical underpinnings of the policy arena, they were largely excluded from the arena and were able to participate only to the extent to which they were able

to block or constrain policy decisions. This produced the configuration that is called a policy vector in this paper. The communication community defines the social relationships that exist within the policy vector.

Power must be understood in terms of the social relationships that constitute the communication community. Power is the product of a common language, cooperative activities, mutual needs, shared history and values, and widely understood signs and symbols. Policy actors who can persuasively identify their problems\solutions as being rooted in the community history and vital to its future tend to attract supporters and emerge as macro-actors.

Policy actors are more or less powerful depending on the number of other policy actors that they can convince to accept their composition of the problem/solution. This gives rise to at least three implications about power in a communication community. One is that relationships are never static, but must be constantly attended and renewed. Relationships may rest on common language, cooperative activities, mutual needs, shared history and values, and widely understood signs and symbols, but relationships may never be at rest. Another implication is that policy decisions cannot be thought of in the way that they are in casual models of power. Instead of cause and effect, we must think of many different policy actors touching, shaping, and transforming policy options into a final policy decision. Last, the communication community is constantly reinventing itself. The present community is the product of its past, but its future depends on the willingness and ability of present policy actors to continue to build on the past by enrolling policy actors in support of a similar future. The present and future are not captives of the past, but instead are open to contest.

For readers who prefer simpler definitions such as those offered in the "faces of power" debates, this must seem like a rather wordy and mathematically imprecise definition. A brief example might help the reader see the validity of the

definition in the context of the higher education policy arena. The example involves the Pell Grant formula's evolution from ACE group recommendation to legislative language.

In the early stages of problematization, ACE was careful not to offer any clear recommendations on the Pell Grant formula. In its Background Papers on HEA Reauthorization Issues (ACE, November, 1989), ACE outlined broad policy issues, but offered no specific solutions. This established a pattern that continued for the next two years as ACE worked to define the parameters and then interest other associations in a solution that would fit within those parameters. It was not until April 1991, that the ACE process produced a specific proposal for the Pell Grant formula (DeLoughry, 1991 May 1). The plan offered by the associations called for a basic grant of \$2,500 plus one-quarter of a student's tuition for a grand total of no more than \$4,000 in academic year 1994-95. To address the needs of middle income students, Pell Grants would be extended to families making up to \$43,300 per year. Finally, the 60 percent cost rule would be removed.

In looking at the plan, one can see how different associations helped shape and transform the broad policy issues into a specific policy proposal. The tuition sensitivity reflects the needs of private institutions who were concerned about continued accessibility by low income students given the higher costs of private schools. The 60 percent rule change reflects the needs of low tuition institutions who felt that their students were being punished for having selected a low cost school. Finally, assistance for middle income students was an acknowledgment of the widespread belief that a new middle income squeeze was developing.

When the associations offered the plan, they were privately criticized by House and Senate members for being too timid in their request. The members wanted to build support for a Pell Grant entitlement and the associations' plan

weakened their efforts. Charles B. Saunders (1991, April 3), ACE Senior Vice President, summarized the associations' position when he noted that "this desirable goal hardly seemed feasible" (p. B2).

In June 1991, the associations responded to this criticism by moving closer to the position of House Subcommittee Chair Ford. The associations increased their formula so that the maximum award would be \$4,500 ("Ways & Means," 1991, June 12). Still, the associations did not call for a Pell Grant entitlement. When it became clear that Congress would have little money available to increase the size of individual Pell Grant awards, the associations offered a compromise formula that continued to reflect the needs of the various associations. Ford's Staff Director Wolanin noted that the formula had to be "taken very seriously because it represents a consensus of people who might otherwise be at war with each other" (quoted in DeLoughry, 1992, May 13, p. A25).

Despite the lack of support from the associations, both the House and Senate bills contained entitlement provisions. The formulas for awarding Pell Grants largely followed the associations' recommendations. The final legislation also reflected the influence of the associations on the Pell Grant formula, but without the support of the associations, the Committees were forced to remove the Pell Grant entitlement provisions from the legislation. The associations did offer a last minute burst of support for the entitlement provisions, but in field interviews Congressional staff questioned the sincerity of the effort and blamed the associations for missing an historic opportunity. The associations are now in the position of having to renew and repair their relationships with Congressional staff members.

In conclusion, the use of the communication community concept does not exclude the possibility of considering extant power theories or the development of a new theory. For example, President Bush's threat to veto the legislation would

certainly fit with Dahl's (1957) concept of power or even with Bachrach and Baratz (1962). The heavy representation of elites in the policy arena might suggest that Mills (1956) is a better fit. At this point in the research, the use of Dewey's implied communication community provides the best fit, but this may well change as the research continues to unfold. Still any theory that replaces the concept of power as a product of a communication community will have to be grounded in that community.

Conclusion

As the initial report of a work in progress, this paper has welded together what might have been three separate papers - one on the sociology of translation, a second on the boundaries and shape of the higher education policy arena, and a third on the meaning of power. The three are combined here to give the reader some sense of the larger project. In addition, the three larger topics are condensed to demonstrate their interdependence and the necessity of understanding the translation process, the policy arena configuration, and the meaning of power in any study of the higher education policy arena.

The sociology of translation offers a methodological approach that does not predetermine the outcome of the research, but provides a framework that lets meaning emerge from the social setting being studied. This offers an opportunity for renewing the use of power as a construct in policy research. The policy arena in which the translation process takes place has changed significantly over the past decade. What was once a soft triangle is now a policy vector. The Executive branch has forfeited its role as a policy participant and taken up the role of a policy barrier. This leaves the associations and the Congress to look for an intersection of policy interests that can be negotiated or forced past the Executive.

One of the findings that emerges from this study is the importance of knowledge, communications, coalition building, and grounding policy proposals in

the history and culture of the policy arena. The social relationships that foster the exchange and interaction between the Congress and the associations constitutes a communication community. Power in this type of community is the product of a common language, cooperative activities, mutual needs, shared history and values, and widely understood signs and symbols. Policy actors are more or less powerful depending on the number of other policy actors they can convince to accept their composition of the problem/solution.

In future papers, the translation process, the policy arena, and the question of power will be explored individually. One possible result is that the findings on the boundaries and shape of the policy arena and/or the meaning of power may change from what has been reported in this paper. Whatever may result, the findings will draw their validity from the reality of the policy arena as it is rather than from a theory of what it should be.

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